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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
EVIDENCE OF CLAIMANT'S INSUBORDINATION WAS NOT 
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND SHOULD 
NOT BE DISREGARDED BY THIS COURT. 
Evidence of Fullerton's insubordination, threats, 
quarreling and disrespect to co-workers may in of itself be 
sufficient evidence to warrant discharge. Despite the 
Respondent's assertion to the contrary, evidence of Fullerton's 
insubordination, threats, quarreling and disrespect to 
co-workers was raised and considered in the hearing before the 
ALJ. Testifying before the ALJ, Mr. Earl Ellis stated: 
It was early morning, I was working 
graveyard shift at the time. He walked in 
to ask for a battery change, and I told him 
I would be right there. I got up and wiped 
my hands to walk out, by that time he'd 
already pushed the other battery back in. 
He had trouble putting the retaining plate 
in and started beating on the machine. I 
asked him to stop; he wouldn't stop. I told 
him, I said, MYou break that cover, I'm 
going to have to turn you in.M His response 
was, "I don't give a shit, go ahead and turn 
me in. It will be the last thing you ever 
do." 
R. 0032 
The employer initially argued that Fullerton was 
discharged for not following a reasonable policy, rule or 
instruction from the employer. Likewise, the Utah Department 
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of Employment Security Division expressly stated that the 
Claimant was discharged for disqualifying just cause. 
Subparagraph 7 of the company policy sheet (identified as 
Exhibit 4 in the hearing before the ALJ, and submitted into 
evidence before the ALJ) R. 0008 lists "Quarreling or fighting 
with other employees" as cause for immediate dismissal. The 
record reflects that evidence of such conduct was presented to 
the ALJ. Such evidence was expressly included in the ALJ's 
Findings of Fact. R. 0055-56. 
The issue of quarreling, threats and insubordination 
was also raised by Robert F. Watson, in his letter of appeal to 
the Board of Review. Mr. Watson stated "...the claimant also 
threatened Mr. Ellis if he did turn him in, and proceeded to 
strike the equipment again..." R. 0065 (A copy of the 
Robert F. Watson letter is attached hereto.) It is clear from 
the record that the evidence of threats, vulgar language and 
insubordination was also considered by the Board of Review. 
(R. 0083 referencing Mr. Ellis1 testimony cited above.). The 
Respondent correctly asserts that matters raised for the first 
time on appeal should not be considered by this Court on 
appeal. See, Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987). 
However, this is not the first time that the issue of 
insubordination, threats and quarreling have been raised in 
this matter. A matter is sufficiently raised that it may be 
raised on appeal if that matter has been submitted to the trial 
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court and the trial court has had an opportunity to make 
findings of fact or law. James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
The Appellant's review of Utah case law holding that 
appellate courts will not hear issues raised for the first time 
on appeal reveals that no such cases have involved 
administrative hearings such as the one at issue here held 
before the Industrial Commission. Such hearings are unique in 
that they do not generally generate the type of pleadings 
associated with regular trials. That is, there are generally 
no trial briefs, jury instructions, motions in limine, or 
similar pleading wherein issues may and should be raised. 
Generally, the only way issues are raised in such 
administrative hearings is if they are brought to the attention 
of the ALJ during the hearing. Such was the case in this 
matter with regard to evidence of insubordination, threats and 
quarreling, as is evidenced by the ALJ's findings of fact. For 
these reasons, the Court should not disregard the Petitioner's 
argument regarding insubordination, threats and quarreling with 
co-workers. 
POINT II 
CLAIMANT'S ACTION WAS NOT AN ISOLATED, 
UNINTENTIONAL ACT AND CONSTITUTES GROUND FOR 
IMMEDIATE DISCHARGE. 
The record is replete with evidence of the Claimant's 
intentional destruction of company property. Petitioner's 
-4-
brief identifies the fact that Fullerton was earlier suspended 
for willful destruction of company property on January 31, 
1990. He was also suspended for unsafe operation of equipment 
on April 19, 1989. R. 0009. Even if this Court is only free to 
consider the April 2, 1992 incident in a vacuum, any such 
single violation of willful abusive conduct is sufficient to 
demonstrate employee culpability. See, Kehl v. Board of 
Review, 700 P.2d 1129 (Utah 1985) discussed more fully in the 
Petitioner's brief. Additionally, company policy expressly 
states that willful destruction of company property or 
quarreling with co-employees constitute grounds for immediate 
dismissal. 
POINT III 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S FACTUAL FINDING IS NOT 
RATIONALLY BASED UPON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Respondent defines the issue on appeal as whether 
there is "substantial evidence in light of the whole record to 
support the Board of Review's findings." However, the 
Respondent incorrectly portrays the Petitioner's argument as 
merely a weighing of "the relative credibility of the testimony 
of Mr. Ellis and Mr. Fullerton." The Board of Review and the 
ALJ acted unreasonably and irrationally by unduly crediting 
Mr. Fullerton's inconsistent and incredible testimony in light 
of not only Mr. Ellis' unbiased testimony, but also in light of 
the overwhelming evidence to the contrary provided by Darrell 
Kidd, Albertson's warehouse operation's manager, Scott 
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Bradshaw, the perishable superintendent of Albertson's, and 
Mr. Fullerton's own inconsistent statements. 
The ALJ places much emphasis upon the fact that 
Mr. Ellis could not see the Claimant's feet for a brief moment, 
when the Claimant claims to have been standing on the rollers 
and slipped, accidentally hitting the equipment. R. 0055. 
While Mr. Ellis states that for a moment he could not see the 
Claimant's feet. R. 0051. Ellis also testified that he earlier 
saw the Claimant standing on the rail, not the rollers, and 
striking the equipment. R. 0031. Not only does Mr. Ellis 
contradict the Claimant's statement that he was on the rollers, 
but Darrell Kidd, based upon his experience and Fullerton's 
experience, likewise stated that he could not understand why 
anyone would stand on the rollers to move the battery. R. 0047. 
Similarly, the Claimant stated that he could not wait 
for help from Ellis to change the battery, because he had a 
"quota to keep" so he tried to change it himself. R. 0040. 
Mr. Kidd testified that the perishable day shift forklift 
operators do not have a quota R. 0046 and that employees have 
been instructed never to change the batteries by themselves. 
R. 0046-47. 
Despite Mr. Ellis' testimony that he watched the 
Claimant beat on the equipment at a time the Claimant was not 
standing on the rollers R. 0032 the ALJ accepted the 
Claimant's version that his feet accidentally slipped on the 
- f i -
rollers. The ALJ's conclusion is unreasonable and not based 
upon substantial evidence when considered, not just against 
Mr. Ellis' testimony but against Mr. Bradshaw's testimony and 
against Mr. Fullerton's own contradictory statement. The 
Claimant had earlier stated that the equipment was damaged when 
it had slipped out of his fingers. R. 0037-38. The Respondent 
is incorrect in stating that "the record. . .reflects that the 
critical elements of the Claimant's account have remained 
constant." When first questioned about the incident, by 
Mr. Bradshaw, Ellis denied any involvement. R. 0037. Then, 
after being told of Ellis' statement, the Claimant claims the 
equipment was damaged because it had grease on it and slipped 
out of his fingers. R. 0037-38. Lastly, the Respondent argues 
that the equipment was damaged when he slipped and fell on the 
rollers banging the equipment. It was unreasonable for the ALJ 
and for the Board of Review to accept such inconsistent 
testimony in light of substantial evidence to the contrary. 
CONCLUSION 
The record reflects that evidence of the Claimant's 
insubordination, threats and quarreling with co-workers has 
been raised and considered from the beginning of this case and 
should be considered by this Court in making its determination 
of whether the Claimant was properly terminated for cause. 
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Despite the Respondent's assertions to the contrary, the 
Claimant's action was not an isolated, unintentional act and 
thus, constitutes grounds for immediate discharge. Even if the 
incident is considered in a vacuum, such a single violation of 
willful, abusive conduct is sufficient to demonstrate employee 
culpability. 
The Board of Review's findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the Court. It is not simply a matter of weighing the 
testimony of Mr. Ellis and Mr. Fullerton. The ALJ and the 
Board of Review unreasonably failed to credit the testimony of 
other disinterested witnesses and to take into account the 
Claimant's own contradictory statements. The Appellant's 
evidence on the record clearly establishes the employee's 
culpability, knowledge and control. For these reasons, the 
Court should reverse the unreasonable findings of the Board of 
Review and deny the benefits sought by the Claimant. 
DATED this ^ day of February, 1993. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By y&tzyc^^^*^^—' 
Roger'j. McConkie 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM 
IX ATTENDANCE, STATUS AND P*i: 
1. Due to the perishable nature of many of the commodities, and in order to prevent spoilage and to meet delivery and 
production schedules, all employees must/eport to work as scheduled. 
2. When unable to report to work, call in sufficiently in advance of the shift to enable your supervisor to provide a 
replacement Absence without advising your supervisor or manager will be considered as voluntary resignation. 
3 Report to work on time. Record all time worked on your time card. Employee must review and agree to comply with 
the Company's stated Time Clock Policy and Procedures. 
4. It is your own responsibility to keep informed of when you will be expected to work. Work schedules will be posted 
near the time clock. 
5 Advise your immediate supervisor promptly oi any cnange in name, aooress, teiepnone numoer, marital status, or 
number of dependents, so the Company and Internal Revenue records may be kept current. 
X CAUSES FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL:,, 
The following acts will not be tolerated and will oe considered surncient cause Tor immediate discharge: 
1. Drinking intoxicants, or the use or possession of any illegal stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic substance, on' 
Company premises at any time, whether on or off shift, or reporting to work under the effect of intoxicants, or any1 
Illegal stimulant, or hallucinogenic substance' 
2. Excessive tardiness, or absence without proper reason or notice to management 
3 Proven immoral or Illegal behavior on Company premises. 
4. Any fraudulent act or statement directly related to Company business.^ 
5 Excessive wage attachments or harrassment of the Company by your unpaid creditors. 
6. Unauthorized possession of or damage to Company funds, property, or merchandise/ 
7. Quarreling or fighting with other employees. 
8. Mishandling of Company funds or property. Any employee willfully damaging Company property, or breaking and/or 
removing from the Company~premises, any merchandise for the purpose of eating V pilferage, will be subject to 
immediate termination. All merchandise leaving the warehouse or plant must be accompanied by an invoice. 
9. Gambling on Company property. 
10 Insubordination, falsifying records, disclosing confidential Information, or any other act constituting willful disregard 
of the Company's best interest. 
XI. BONDING* All employees must be bonded The premium involved shall be paid by the Company. In the event the Com-
pany's regular bonding company refuses to give bond to any employee for any reason, then and in that event, the 
employee will be subject to immediate termination. 
XII. CHAUFFEUR'S LICENSES: All driver-warehousemen will be required to have a valid Chauffeur's License In the states 
where they are required and for the state where the plant or distribution center Is located, within fifteen (15) days after 
they are employeed. After fifteen (15) days of employment, all driver-warehousemen must at all times have a valid 
Chauffeur's License. The license must be carried with them at all times. No exceptions will be made. 
XIII. PASSENGERS No driver-warehouseman will allow anyone, other than employees of the employer who are on duty, 
to ride on his truck. This will not prohibit the driver-warehouseman from picking up other drivers, helpers, or others in 
wrecked or broken down motor equipment and transporting them to the first available point of communication, repair,' 
lodging, or available medical attention. 
XIV. COMPANY IMAGE: All actions by employees reflect upon the image of Albertson's, Inc., and In your dealings with the 
public, you should at all times conduct yourself in a manner that is beyond reproach. This includes being cautious of 
your actions in public, your dress and personal appearance, driving habits, language, etc 
I hereby certify that I have read and understand the above Distribution and Manufacturing policies; and that in connection with 
the application for employment with, continued employment by, or advancement with Albertson's, Inc., I have been advised 
through receipt of this form that: 
1. An Investigative consumer report as to my character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of 
living may be made and, 
2. I have the right to make a written request within a reasonable time for a complete and accurate disclosure of the. 
nature and scope of the investigation requested. 
I also acknowledge that any report or other information required by Federal or State law now or hereafter In affect, shall be 
deemed received by me If addressed to me at my last known addressT 
'
 r
 < '' ^ Witness by Supervisor ^Sfi/I It r P i (cD JO Signature r  f > it bvSupervisor >!>?ft lirFifty I J&?UA{ <y*JL, 
Distribution Center or Plant. 
Original - Personnel File 1st Copy - Employee 2nd Copy P j n ^ i K i T 0 ^ F$lcPr 
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Albertsons9 
April 19, 1989 
TO: Gayle Fullerton 
FROM: Kirk Hansen 
SUBJECT: SUSPENSION^ (UNSAFE OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT) 
r
Tou are hereby placed on a disciplinary suspension without pay beginning 
April 20, 1989. You are to report to work at your regularly scheduled 
time April 25, 1989. This suspension is due to your unsafe operation of 
equipment. Any further incidents of this nature will result in termination. 
/ 
EXHIBITS 
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ELLIS 
JUDGE 
ELLIS 
JUDGE 
ELLIS 
JUDGE 
ELLIS 
JUDGE 
EEilS 
JUDGE 
ELLIS 
JUDGE 
Okay. And do we need to call Mr. Ellis? 
Yes. He witnessed the final incident. 
Okay, Thank you. Be right back. (OFF RECORD) 
Wefre back on record. No testimony was taken or given during the time 
that we were off record. I left the rocm to get Mr. Ellis to testify. 
Would you agree, sir, that that's what occurred? 
Yes. 
Blank you. Would you agree, Ms. Henderson? 
Yes. 
Thank you. Been called to testify, Mr. Ellis. Would you raise your 
right hard to be sworn* 
QftlH ADMINISTERED. Mr. Ellis answered in the affirmative. 
Thank you, sir. If youfd state your name and position with the company. 
Earl Layne Ellis, Maintenance. 
And the occpany for which you work is Albertsons. 
Albertsons Distribution. 
And hew long have you been with them? 
Three (3) years. 
And in your capacity did you work with Mr. Fullerton? 
As changing batteries for him, yes, I did. 
Okay. And is there something that you observed, then, with respect to a 
forklift in April? 
A reach (?) truck, yes. 
A what kind of truck? 
Reach truck. 
Reach truck. Okay. When did this occur? 
000021 
ELLIS It was early morning, I was working graveyard shift at the time. He 
walked in to ask for a battery change, and I told him Ifd be right 
there. I got up and wiped my hards to walk out, by that time hefd 
already pushed the other battery back in. He had trouble putting the 
retaining plate in and started beating on the machine. I asked him to 
stop; he wouldnft stop. I told him, I said, "you break that cover, Ifm 
gonna have to turn you inH. His response then was, lfI donft give a 
shit, go ahead and turn me in. It'll be the last thing you ever do,f. 
JUDGE And what happened? 
ELLIS He beat on it a couple more times then—then left. 
JUDGE Did it break? 
ELLIS Yes, it did. 
JUDGE Okay. Then vfaat did you do? 
ELLIS As soon as my supervisor came in, I reported the incident. 
JUDGE Okay, thank you. Ms. Henderson. 
HENDERSON Yes. You testified that Mr. Fullerton came and asked you to help him 
replace the battery. How long was it from the time he asked you to help 
him replace the battery until the time you witnessed him banging the 
battery on the plate? 
ELLIS Certainly less than a minute. 
HENDERSON Less than a minute? 
ELLIS Uh-hnm. 
HENDERSON And is it your job duty to help assist with — 
FT ITS To assist fem, right. 
HENDERSON Okay. Wbuld it be normal—would it be protocol for the claimant to try 
and change the battery by himself? 
FTI.TS it happens; yes, mafam. 
HENDERSON Okay. Did you see where the claimant was standing, the claimant being 
Mr. Fullerton, where he was standing at the time? 
FT ITS He was standing on the rack. 
HENDERSON Can you describe what the rack is? 
10 
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UDGE Oh, okay. Be right back. (OFF RECORD) 
We're back on record. No testimony was taken or given during the time 
that we were off record. I simply went and got Mr. Bradshaw. Would you 
agree, Mr. Spencer? 
IPENCER Yes. 
UDGE Thank y o u . Would y o u a g r e e , Ms. Henderson? 
HENDERSON Yes. 
JUDGE Thank you. Youfve been called to testify, sir. Would you raise your 
right hand? 
OATH ADMINISTERED. Mr. Bradshaw answered in the affirmative. 
Thank you, sir. If youfd state your name and position? 
BRADSHAW Scott Bradshaw, Perishable Superintendent of Albertsons. 
JUDGE Okay; and as such, were the direct supervisor of Mr. Fullerton? 
BRADSHAW Yes. 
JUDGE And hew long have you been his direct supervisor? 
BRADSHAW A couple years, new. 
JUDGE Okay. And did you interview him with respect to what occurred with the 
forklift? 
BRADSHAW Yes. 
JUDGE Okay. And tell me when the incident occurred and when you talked to 
him? 
BRADSHAW The date, I don't have exactly. It's written on the letters. 
JUDGE Okay. 
BRADSHAW I called him in after LaVell James had approached me and told me what 
Earl had told him. And that's when I called Mr. Fullerton in, and we 
*-J»IVPH about it; and it started out where he denied anything, as far as 
involvement with the battery, or the lid, or \Aiatever. And we proceeded 
to tell him about what was said, and vtot we've heard, and what Earl and 
LaVell had told me. Later he said it was an accident, and that it was— 
15 
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had grease on it and it slipped out of his fillers. And that was, 
basically, I donft knew (pause) — 
JUDGE Okay. Anything else you said to him? 
BRADSHAW No. 
JUDGE Okay, thank you. Go ahead, Ms. Henderson? 
HENDERSON You testified the conversation that you had, at any tine did 
Mr. Fullerton make the excuse that he was standing on same rollers and 
had slipped? 
BRADSHAW None. 
HENDERSON Okay. And you said that at first he denied anything to do with the 
battery, is that all he said or can you expand on vfoat he said? 
BRADSHAW (Unintelligible), I danft; but he just acted like he didn't know nothing 
about it at first; and then as we got into talking and explaining that— 
that Earl seen him do this and LaVell told ine this, and thatfs when he 
said it was an accident. 
HENDERSON Okay. New, did you make the decision to discharge the claimant? 
BRADSHAW No. 
HENDERSON Okay. And—and who was that decision made by, in part? 
BRADSHAW Through Darrel, and I'm sure he had a conference with Boise. 
HENDERSON Okay. No further questions. 
JUDGE Thank you. Any questions you have, sir? 
SPENCER Scott, during your interview with Mr. Fullerton, I guess during your 
investigative portion of this incident, did Gayle at any time state that 
the battery cover was already broken? 
BRADSHAW (Pause) Uh, no. 
SPENCER And you already testified that he said he—he didn't say anything about 
standing on the rollers and sliding, or slipping, or—or anything of 
that nature? 
BRADSHAW No, nothing; no. 
SPENCER lhatfs all I have, Your Honor. 
16 
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UDGE Okay. I assume that that has to do with the damaged forklift or reach 
truck, is that correct? 
1AIMANT Yes. 
UDGE All right. When—when did this occur; do you remember the date? 
IAIMANT (No audible response) 
UDGE Calendar help you at all? 
IAIMANT (long pause) 
RJDGE If you don't, thatfs okay. I just — 
IAIMANT It's—it's the date that was stated en the report, I believe. 
JUDGE About April 2nd? 
3AIMANT Yeah. 
JUDGE Okay. What happened? 
CLAIMANT I went in to get a battery change and it was, I believe, afternoon not 
morning. And I went in to ask Earl to ocme and help me. And I went out 
and I waited. It wasn't one minute; it was at least five (5) minutes. 
And I have a quota to keep; so I just took it upon myself to change the 
battery. I kicked the battery out. I—I switched batteries, and I 
pushed the fresh battery back in; and the batteries sit on rollers. And 
there's no way you can push 'em in without standing on those rollers. 
There's just no other way to do it. And usually you use the rollers as 
a brace to—to get enough force behind the battery, because they are so 
big and heavy, to push it in. And a lot of times, you knew, you—you 
need help to do that. But I've had a lot of experience at it; so I got 
the battery back in and by this time Earl had cone out. And, to me, he 
seemed like he was in a bad mood because I believe they had just got a 
butt chewing from—because they weren't keeping the machines in good 
operating order. 'Cause we were always having lifts break down and it 
was holding us up on our production. So he, to me, seemed to be in a 
bad way. 
JUDGE What made you think that? 
ClAIMANT Because he had an attitude of just, uh, short-tenpered. 
JUDGE Anything he did or said that made you think that? 
CLAIMANT Uh, I can't remember exactly. Just I had that iirpression. That was the 
impression I had, but I don't exactly remember v*iat was said. 
18 
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Thanks. Go ahead, sir. 
No, I would not have—I would not have changed the decision that'd been 
made based on what (unintelligible). 
And why not? 
I do not believe that Earl has any rootivaticn to fabricate a story 
stating that Gayle was pounding, repeatedly, on the piece of equipment. 
He certainly has nothing to gain by that. And as you have heard, 
neither one of the employees has had any previous problems with each 
other. There's no personal vendetta, and certain cannot fathom anything 
to substantiate Earl fabricating such a story. He was there; he 
witnessed Gayle hitting the machine repeatedly and witnessed the damage, 
immediately following that. And had reported it, as he said, to his 
immediate supervisor as soon as he came in. 
Okay. Any other questions you have of him? 
Yes. While the two warnings that happened sometime earlier did not play 
a crucial role in your decision, did you feel that—that the claimant 
had demonstrated this type of behavior in the past and that may have 
COTitributed to the decision? 
Yes. Yes; indeed, it did. 
Okay. The claimant testified that he had waited more than five (5) 
minutes, we have a few minutes time discrepancy, but that he was—he had 
a quota that he needed to meet. Does—does Mr. Fullerton have a quota? 
The perishable day shift for our forklift operators do not have a quota. 
They are required to put away as much product as they possibly can 
throughout their shift. They are monitored by the supervision of their 
immediate foreman and supervisor, and we do not actually track pallets 
per hour or discipline them for, for exairple, not putting away enou^i 
product; and there has not been one incident in the past, to my 
knowledge, where an employee was reprimanded for taking too long to 
change a battery. 
Okay. Mr. Bradshaw testified that in the meeting Mr. Fullerton did not 
provide the excuse that he had slipped on rollers; but had he provided 
that excuse, Mr. Ellis testified that he did not see Mr. Fullerton on 
the rollers. The claimant testified that he had to stand on the 
rollers, there was no way to change the battery without standing on the 
rollers. Do you have any knowledge on changing a battery? (Telephone 
ringing) 
Yes, I'm familiar with the way the batteries are changed. Employees in 
the past have been instructed never to change the batteries by 
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themselves; we danft believe itfs safe. And, personally, I cannot 
understand why a person having as much knowledge about changing these 
batteries as Gayle would, since he's been operating that type of 
equipment for approximately eight (8) years, why he would even stand on 
the roller to begin with. Of course, I didn't witness the incident. I 
can't say that he was not standing on the roller. Had that been the 
cause of him slipping and falling, I—I also can't imagine why he would 
not bring that up at the time he was being terminated. 
But if—in response to his claim that there's no other way to pushing a 
battery without standing on the rollers, you would have to rebut that, 
according to what you've just said? 
That is—Absolutely. 
Let's not put words in his mouth, okay. 
Would you have to say that that's not accurate? 
That's—that is not accurate. It's—it is not necessary to stand on the 
rollers to change the battery, to take it in—to put it in or take it 
cut. 
Okay. No further questions. 
Thank you. Any questions you have? 
While it's not necessary to stand on the rollers to change the battery, 
would it be more convenient, would it be conducive for an enplqyee to do 
so even though that it might be against the rules? 
I can't understand why. Pushing a 1500-pound battery, I cannot imagine 
why anyone would want to stand on rollers that were designed to move a 
1500-pound weight freely. 
And you stated that there—there was not a quota for—for the pallet 
track (?) operators as to hew many pallets a day that they put away. 
Isn't it Albertsons' policy to extract or get the production of their 
employees at a high level and by doing so, that they, while maybe not 
setting a quota, they do have a standard or a expected goal? 
The amount of product that a forklift operator puts away is not 
individually tracked. Scott Bradshaw does monitor the toted amount of 
pallets put away by all the forklift operators in one shift; and that is 
for his—used by him as a tool to know hew productive the shift is, as a 
whole, in putting product away. Of course, that verifies for—for 
many—for various reasons. Seme equipment may break dewn, people may 
not be there, they may be extremely busy and congested. The—I sinply 
was trying to make a point that as far as a quota, or a minimum 
25 
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ELLIS Right, when I offered to hold it in after he'd been striking it. He 
didnft put the plate in, continued to beat on it. I walked to the back 
of it 'cause I didn't want to get hit in the face with anything. 
JUDGE Okay. So in the beginning, then, you were at the opposite side of the 
forklift. 
ELLIS As I was walking out, like I stated, he was hitting it. 
JUDGE Okay. Yeah, what—Okay, when you first came in, then you came in, 
probably, where your finger is, we'll put that north. 
ELLIS Right. 
JUDGE Okay. So you were at the north there, and then he was at the west. 
ELLIS Uh-hrtro. 
JUDGE Then you moved from the north, then, over to the east; and between you, 
then, was the forklift, is that correct? 
ELLIS Ricpit; uh-hnm. 
JUDGE Okay. When you got over here, \Aiat was occurring? 
ELLIS He was—wouldn't put the plate in. Was hitting it again. 
JUDGE Okay. And how could you see him? 
ELLIS I couldn't see his feet at that particular minute. 
JUDGE Okay. 
FT ITS But, like I said, in walking frcm the backside to the—from the north 
side to the east side, — 
JUDGE North to east, okay. 
FTi.Tfi I'd seen him striking it, standing on the rail, already, from the north 
side. And then when he wouldn't put the plate in, I walked back to the 
north side so that I wouldn't get hit with anything. 
JUDGE Okay. Then anything else ycu have of him, sir? 
SPENCER No. 
JUDGE Okay. You, Ms. Henderson? 
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FINDINGS GP FACT: 
Prior to filing for unemployment benefits effective April 5, 1992, the claimant 
earned $11.10 per hour working full-time as a forklift operator for Albertsons 
where he was employed fron April 5, 1981 to April 3, 1992. The claimant was 
discharged from this enplqyer for the reasons set forth as follows. 
The ocnpany policy allows for the immediate dismissal of an employee who 
willfully damages ccupany property. The claimant was aware of the policy. 
The union contract Albertsons has with Teamsters Local #222 provides that warning 
notices an employee may receive will not remain in effect for more than one year. 
The claimant received two warning notices. One was in April 1989 for operating 
equipment in an unsafe manner. The second was in January 1990 for willful 
destruction of oonpany property. Prior to April 1989, the claimant had received 
no prior reprimands. On approximately April 19, 1989, the claimant had just 
finished putting a pallet on a crown vihen another driver drove up beside him and 
put a pallet beside his. This driver asked the claimant about a business matter. 
In the course of the conversation, the claimant forgot he had not lowered the 
forks. When he drove away and turned the corner, the forks caught on an object 
which resulted in the forklift tipping over. The claimant was placed on 
suspension without pay from April 20, 1989 to April 25, 1989. On January 31, 
1990, the crew was leaving early. It was Superbowl Sunday. The door to the time 
clock was locked. The claimant and two others began "goofing around" by banging 
on the door. The claimant kicked the door. He hit it harder than he expected. 
A board by the doorknob cracked. The claimant estimated the cost of repair to be 
$5.00. The door did not open. The claimant received two weeks suspension 
without pay for the infraction. 
On April 2, 1992, the claimant needed to change his lift trucks battery. The 
claimant was a long term employee and had experience performing this task. The 
batteries weighed fifteen hundred to eighteen hundred pounds. The batteries are 
on rollers so they can be pushed out of the truck onto a truck like rack system 
with rollers. In turn, the new battery moves off onto the truck on rollers. A 
heavy metal plate holds the battery in place. The process takes two people. 
The claimant drove his reach truck along side of the battery rack. He asked the 
maintenance person for a battery change. While he was waiting for the 
maintenance man, he removed the old battery. He had pushed the new battery into 
the truck but was having difficulty securing it with the metal plate. The 
maintenance man was on the opposite side of the truck. In this position, the 
maintenance man could not see the claimant's feet. The claimant slipped. When 
he tried to regain his balance, the metal plate he had in his hand hit the lift 
and chipped it. The maintenance man believed the claimant purposefully broke the 
battery cover. The maintenance man told the claimant if he did that again he 
would turn him in. The claimant responded to go ahead and turn him in and that 
it would be the last thing he did. The claimant thought the maintenance man was 
joking. Both perceived the other to be in a bad mood that day. 
The maintenance man did report the claimant to his supervisor. In addition, he 
wrote: 
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(*i april 2, 1992 at the approximate time of 5:30 a.m. Gail 
(sic) Fullerton asked for a battery. When I got out there he 
had pushed his old battery out and his new one in and had 
difficulty putting in the retaining plate for the battery and 
started hitting the top plastic cover repeatedly, when I told 
him to stop or I would turn him in he hit it one more time 
and told me to go ahead he didn't give a shit. Then he told 
me if I did Ifd regret it. 
Earl L. Ellis 
4-2-92 
Based on the maintenance persons account of what occurred, coupled with the past 
reprimands, the company decided the claimant willfully broke the plastic battery 
cover and discharged him. The claimant did tell the catpany the damage was not 
intentionally. 
KEASCtONS AMO 0CNOUU5ICN OF IAW: 
The company did consider the past reprimands when deciding to discharge the 
claimant. The 1989 and 1990 incidents were given no weicfrit with respect to this 
decision. The company violated its union agreement by adding these reprimands to 
their decision to dismiss the claimant. Both incidents occurred over two years 
ago, well outside the time limitation, as per the union contract, for 
consideration. Moreover, the 1989 occurrence was a one time isolated instance 
due to inadvertence when the claimant became distracted. The 1990 mishap was the 
result of horseplay. While the kicking of the door is not cordoned, it was not 
meant to be destructive. 
The claimant and the maintenance man have some crucial differences in their 
testimony with respect to the April 2, 1992 battery change. The maintenance man 
testified the claimant beat the plastic battery cover repeatedly. He did not say 
the claimant broke it, however. The claimant stated he did not break this cover 
nor did he hit it. He contends it was broken before he went to the battery area. 
The claimant asserts he lost his balance v*iile changing the battery and, in this 
process, the metal plate he was holding in his hand inadvertently hit the fork 
lift. Inportantly, the maintenance man could not view the claimant's feet during 
the entire process. While their testimony is different, the claimant seems more 
credible to the Administrative Law Judge. Even if the credibility issue is net 
considered, the weight of the evidence in a discharge case rests with the 
enplqyer. If the weight is equal, the scales tip to the claimant in a discharge 
case. 
Section 35-4-5 (b) (1) of the Utah Employment Security Act provides that a 
claimant for unemployment insurance benefits is not eligible if he or she was 
discharged from employment for just cause or an act or omission in connection 
with the enplcyment which was deliberate, willful or wanton and adverse to the 
enplqyerfs rightful interests. In order to support a denial of unemployment 
insurance benefits, an employer most establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence the claimant was at fault in causing his or her cwn unemployment. That 
is, the claimant must be shown to have had a substantial degree of control, 
knowledge and culpability in the cxaxtuct resulting in discharge. Thus, a 
claimant will not generally be denied unemployment benefits where discharged for 
mere inability, inefficiency, inadvertence or isolated incidents of good faith 
error in jirigment or ordinary negligence. 
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The employer did not establish by the preponderance of the evidence that the 
claimant's actions rose to the level of culpability# knowledge and control to 
impose a disqualification. The claimant's testimony is accepted that the damage 
done on April 2, 1992 was accidental. It is held he was discharged at the 
convenience of the employer but not for disqualifying just cause. Benefits are 
awarded. 
A contributing eatplqyer may be relieved of charges if an individual is separate 
for reasons which are disqualifying. Since the claimant was separated for 
reasons vftiich are not disqualifying, the enployer is not relieved of charges, far 
the claim. 
DBCTSICN: 
The decision of the adjudicator denying benefits pursuant to Section 35-4-5 (b) (1) 
of the Utah Btplqyment Security Act is reversed. Benefits are allowed effective 
April 5, 1992 and continuing provided the claimant is otherwise eligible. 
Albertsons is not relieved of charges for Gayle M. Fullerton pursuant to Section 
35-4-7 (c) 3(C) of the Act. 
La Vone lAddle^S&ironal ^ ^ ^ 
Administrative Law Judge 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
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TOMPANH 
fid Box 57832 
Salt lake City, Utah 84157 
Telephone (801) 261-0071 
Fax (801) 261-0110 
Ju ly 20, 1992 
Board of Review 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Department of Employment Security 
P. 0. Box 11600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Re: Gayle M. Fullerton 
SS# 528-11-6899 
Case No. 92-BR-241 
Dear Board Members: 
The Gibbens Company, on behalf of the employer, Albertson's Inc., 
requests a thorough review of the decision of the Administrative 
Law Judge, dated June 3, 1992, that reversed a previous decision 
of the adjudicator dated April 5, 1992. 
In the hearing, Mr. Earl Layne Ellis, maintenance for Albertson's, 
testified that the claimant struck company property several times 
in order to attempt to replace a retaining plate for a replaced 
battery (Trans, pg. 10, para. 1). In the process of beating on 
this equipment, damage occurred in the amount of $169.48 (employer's 
exhibit #7). When the claimant was told to stop beating on the 
equipment by Mr. Ellis, the claimant struck the equipment again. 
The employer has a policy that establishes willful damage to 
company property is grounds for immediate termination. The 
claimant was aware of this policy and had signed this document 
(employer exhibit #4). The claimant has had a history of behavior 
regarding damage to company propert (ALJ decision pg. 3) 
(Trans, pg. 6). 
The claimant testified he damaged the company's property by 
accident (Trans, pg. 30). Mr. Ellis testified that not only had 
the claimant struck the equipment several times after Mr. Ellis 
threatened to report the claimant if he didn't stop beating on 
the equipment, the claimant also threatened Mr. Ellis if he did 
turn him in, and proceeded to strike the equipment again 
(Trans, pg. 10). 
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If the claimant had slipped and struck the equipment by 
accident, as he claims, there would be no reason to strike the 
equipment again unless it was intentional. At no time did the 
claimant provide the excuse that hitting the equipment was an 
accident (Trans, pg. 1). 
Mr. Darrell Kidd, Warehouse Operations Manager, testified to 
the character and voracity of Mr. Ellis (Trans, pg. 23). The 
claimant's voracity has been in question since the final inci-
dent occurred. When questioned by Mr. Scott Bradshaw, Perishable 
Superintendent, the claimant denied his involvement in this 
incident until pressed with information that had been provided 
from Mr. Ellis and Mr. LaVell James (Trans, pg. 15). 
In conclusion, previous warnings are not required in order to 
discharge an employee who willfully damages company property. 
The claimant has had a history of suspensions for such conduct 
during the past few years. The claimant knew his job would be 
in jeopardy for committing such actions by virtue of previous 
suspensions and a signed document. 
The claimant was asked by maintenance personnel to stop striking 
company equipment. The claimant threatened the maintenance 
personnel and proceeded to strike the equipment again. When 
questioned by management about the incident, he first denied that 
the incident had occurred. When faced with the vane of his 
accusers, the claimant changed his story and stated that it was 
an accident. At the hearing the claimant further changed his 
story and stated that he had slipped, a detail previously not 
mentioned. Mr. Ellis's story has remained the same throughout 
this entire process. 
As such, it is the employer's position that a reasonable review 
of the facts should prevail to establish that the claimant com-
mitted an act of wanton, willful disregard to the employer's 
rightful interest, and that the claimant had, or should have 
known that his actions would or could result in his termination. 
Further, it certainly was within the claimant's control to stop 
striking the company's equipment after being told by maintenance 
personnel to do so. 
And finally, the employer has suffered a substantial loss due 
to the damage caused by the claimant's lack of patience or 
concern. 
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The employer respectfully requests that the initial decision 
to not allow benefits, be reinstated, and that the employer's 
benefits ratio account be relieved of all charges in this 
matter. 
Sincerely, 
Robert F. Watson 
Sr. Account Executive 
RFW:dd 
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S.S.A. NO. 528-11-6899 : 
: Case No. 92-A-3239 
: EEOSICN 
: Case Nb. 92-ER-241 
DEPAKMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY : 
The employer, Albertsans, Inc., appeals the decision of the 
Administrative lav judge in the above-entitled matter which held that the 
claimant, Gayle M. Fullertan, had been discharged fran his employment with 
the employer for reasons that are not disqualifying under Section 
35-4-5 (b)(1) of the Utah Enplqyment Security Act. The ALT's decision, 
therefore, allowed payment of unemployment benefits to the claimant effective 
April 5, 1992, and continuing, provided he is otherwise eligible. The AL7fs 
decision also held the employer liable for benefit charges pursuant to 
Section 35-4-7 (c) of the Act. 
After careful consideration of the record in this matter, the 
Board of Review finds the decision of the Administrative Lav Judge to be a 
correct application of the provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act, 
supported by competent evidence and, therefore, affirms the decision. In so 
holding, the Board of Review adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of 
lav of the Administrative lav Judge. 
The employer argues on appeal that the A U erred in finding the 
claimant slipped and broke the battery plate accidentally. The enployer 
further argues that a thorough review of the record reveals that the 
employer's witness, Mr. Ellis, was more credible than the claimant. 
In affirming the decision of the Administrative lav Judge, the 
Board of Review notes that the employer is correct in its argument that this 
case hinges on balancing the respective credibility of Mr. Ellis and the 
claimant. The A U , who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of both 
witnesses, made a specific finding that the claimant "seems more credible to 
the Administrative Law Judge." The Board of Review only reviews written 
transcripts and documents associated with the Admixvistrative law Jtrige 
hiring and does4 not have the opportunity to observe witnesses. The Board 
must, therefore, rely on the ijipressions of the ALT on matters of credibility 
derived fran observing the demeanor, of the witnesses. Since the 
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Administrative Law Judge found the claimant to be more believable than the 
employer witness and since the AU's finding of fact that the claimant 
accidentally slipped and inadvertently broke the battery plate is supported 
by substantial competent evidence in the record, the Board affirms that 
finding and affirms the Administrative Law Judge's decision that the employer 
did not have just cause within the meaning of the Utah Employment Security 
Act for discharging the claimant. 
This decision becomes final on the date it is mailed, and any 
further appeal must be made within 30 days from the date of mailing. Your 
appeal must be submitted in writing to the Utah Court of Appeals, Midtown 
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. To file an 
appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a 
Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to 
Section 63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and Rule 14 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and 
a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
/s/ Stephen M. Radley 
/s/ Thomas L. Lewis 
Although the Administrative Law Judge made a specific finding 
regarding the respective credibility of the claimant and Mr. Ellis, my 
reading of the record persuades me that Mr. Ellis' version of the incident 
leading to the claimant's discharge is more trustworthy than the claimant's 
and I would overrule the AU's finding that the claimant was more 
credible than Mr. Ellis. 
Mr. Ellis had no apparent advantage to be gained by saying the 
claimant repeatedly and willfully beat on the battery plate. The claimant in 
fact testified that he and Mr. Ellis got along well and no motive is 
suggested in the record why Mr. Ellis would lie. When asked if he could 
have been mistaken about what he saw, Mr. Ellis was steadfast in repeating 
that the claimant was beating on the plate in frustration, not just trying to 
regain his balance after a fall. The claimant on the other hand, when 
accused of beating on the employer's property, had everything to gain by 
claiming he slipped and accidentally damaged the battery plate. The 
claimant's account is further thrown into question because of his claim tore 
years **r1 i*r that he accidentally slipped and broke a door jam when he was 
kicking at a door while horsing around. I find the claimant's repeated 
excuse of "slipping" when others reported more willful behavior to be 
suspicious. 
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Mr. Ellis1 version of the event leading to the claimant1* 
discharge has not varied fran the time he first reported it. He has asserted 
fran the beginning that he saw the claimant beat numerous tl11*^ in 
frustration on the battery plate. The ALT minimized Mr. Ellis1 observation 
by making a finding that Mr. Ellis was unable to see the claimant's feet and 
so could not see if the claimant was falling. Mr. Ellis' testimony, 
however, was that though he momentarily could not see the claimant's feet, 
the claimant was not falling, but was clearly beating on the battery plate 
in anger evidenced by the fact that the claimant struck the battery plate 
again and threatened Mr. Ellis after he told him to stop. 
The claimant admitted he hit the battery plate at least twice* 
Ihis version seems inherently inconsistent to me as to hit the plate twice 
would have meant he slipped and fell twice upon the battery plate. Biis is 
not the claimant's testimony. He testified rather that he slipped onoe, then 
stood up, and hit the plate with his hand. This story does not ring true to 
me and is not at all consistent with the observations of Mr. Ellis. For 
these reasons, I would overrule the Administrative Law Judge's finding of 
fact that the employer's property was damaged accidentally by the claimant. 
Furthermore, I disagree with the Administrative law judge's 
conclusions about the inappropriateness of the employer referencing past 
infractions of the claimant in arriving at its conclusion to discharge the 
claimant. Ihe union contract provided that enplqyee warning notices will not 
remain in effect for more than one year. The infraction for which the 
claimant was discharged, willful destruction of ocnpany property, was grounds 
for immediate dismissal under the employer's rules. Ihere was no need on the 
part of the employer to go through any step-by-step disciplinary procedure in 
the face of the claimant's actions and they did not do so. Referencing his 
past behavior of kicking in a door was not necessary to sustain a discharge 
but only adds strength to the employer's argument that this was an employee 
who exercised marginal control over his tenper and who the enployer might 
reasonably expect to see repeat destructive behavior. By referencing the 
claimant's past behavior the employer established both the elements of 
knowledge and harm as required to make a finding of just cause under the Utah 
Employment Security Act. For these reasons, I dissent from the majority 
opinion arri would reverse the decision of the Administrative Law judge that 
the claimant was not discharged for just cause and that the employer is 
chargeable for benefits paid in connection with this claim. 
/s/ Lawrence Disera 
Dated this 27th day of July, 1992. 
Date Hailed: July 30, 1992. 
Utah Court of Appeal 
FEB 5 1993 
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT IS 
The stautes and rules which are determinative iaferic^j)j&!1a" 
matter are set forth verbatim in Appendix A/ and include the 
following: 
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) 
Sections 35-4-5(b)(1), 63-46b-16 and 
78-2a-3(2)(a). 
Utah Administrative Code (1992) 
R562-5b-102 and R562-5b-108.4. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 
14. 
35*4-5 Ineligibility for Benefits. 
An individual is ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a 
waiting period: 
Quit. 
(a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without 
good cause, if so found by the commission, and for each week thereafter 
until the claimant has performed services in bona fide covered employment 
and earned wages for those services equal to at least six times the claimant's 
weekly benefit amount. A claimant shall not be denied eligibility for benefits 
if the claimant leaves work under circumstances of such a nature that it 
would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a dis-
qualification. 
The commission shall, in cooperation with the employer, consider for 
the purposes of this chapter the reasonableness of the claimant's actions, 
and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing 
attachment to the labor market in reaching a determination of whether the 
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and good conscience. 
Quit to Accompany Spouse. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a claimant who has 
left work voluntarily to accompany, follow or join his or her spouse to or in a 
new locality does so without good cause for purposes of this subsection. 
Discharge for Just Cause. 
(b) (1) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just 
cause or for an act or omission in connection with employment, not 
constituting a crime, which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to 
the employer's rightful interest, if so found by the commission, and 
thereafter until the claimant has earned an amount equal to at least six times 
the claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered employment. 
Discharge for D i shones ty . 
(b) (2) For the week in which he was discharged for dishonesty 
constituting a crime or any felony or class A misdemeanor in connection 
with his work as shown by the facts, together with his admission, or as 
shown by his conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction of that crime 
and for the 51 next following weeks and for each week thereafter until the 
claimant has performed services in bona fide covered employment and 
10 
63-46M6 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under thia 
section. 
Hiatory.C. 1953,63-46bl5, enacted by L accordinf to the standards of Subjection 
1987, ck 161, I 171; 1988, ch. 7* I 2*. 63-46M6ttr at the and la Subaection (IXa) 
Amendment Note*. — The 1988 amend- and made minor stylistic chanfaa. 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted •except Effective Date*. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
that Anal agency action from informal a j^udi* { 315 makes the act effective on January I, 
cative proceedings based on a record shall be 193& 
reviewed by the district courts on the record 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Function of district court. the district court will no longer function aa In* 
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final termediate appellate court except to review in* 
agency decisions through formal adjudicative formal adjudicative proceedings de novo purau* 
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Su* ant to Subsection (IXa) of this section. In ra 
preme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, Topik, 761 ?J2d 32 (Utah Ct App. 1988). 
63-46M6. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings, 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
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(0 the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953,63-46b-16, enacted by L. appellate court" in Subsection (2Xa); and aub-
1987, ch. 161, I 272; 1988, ch. 72, * 2S. ttituted "appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
Amendment Notes. — T^e 1988 amend- pellate court" for "Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
ment, effective April 26,1988, substituted "As cedure" in Subsection* (2Xa) and (2Kb). 
provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
Court of Appeals" for Tht Supreme Court or
 f 3 1 6 m&kea ^ a c t e f f ec t ive o n J a n u a r y i , 
other appellate court designated by statute in jp^g 
Subsection (1); inserted "with the appropriate 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Function of district court. trict court will no longer function as intermedi-
Subsection (1) provides that all final agency ate appellate court except to review informal 
decisions through formal adjudicative proceed- adjudicative proceedingi de novo pursuant to 
ings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme t 63-46b-15(lXa). In re Tapik, 761 P.2d 32 
Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, the dis- (Utah Ct App. 1988). 
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the 
district court or the review'of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the 
extent expressly authorized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are re-
viewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute. 
History: C. 1953,63-46b~17, enacted by L. I 315 makes the act effective on January 1, 
1987, ch, 161, I 271 1988. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
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(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court 
of Appeals any of the matters over which the Su-
preme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, ex-
cept: 
(a) capita) felony convictions or sn appeal of 
an interlocutory order of a court of record involv-
ing a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; and 
(e) those matters described in Subsections 
(3Xa) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeals abjudication, but 
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified 
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3Kb). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the re-
quirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings, ists 
78-2-3. Repealed. isat 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges 
pro tempore, and practice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of proce-
dure and evidence for use in the courts of the state 
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The 
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and 
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote 
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize 
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to 
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall 
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and 
admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court ahall by rule govern the 
practice of law, including admission to practice law 
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to 
the practice of law. ltst 
78-2-5. Repealed. isat 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint 
clerks and support staff a* necessary for the operation 
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The 
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be estab-
lished by the appellate court administrator, and 
powers established by rule of the Supreme Court. 
isat 
78-2-7. Repealed. isas 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court 
The court may at any time require the attendance 
and services of any sheriff in the state. isat 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. ISM. isas 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions 
—- Filing fee*. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
There n created a court known as the Court of Ap-
peals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and 
shall have a seal. isat 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Func-
tions — Filing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. 
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the 
Court of Appeals is until the first general election 
held more than three years after the effective date of 
the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and com-
mences on the first Monday in January, next follow* 
ing the date of election. A judge whose term expires 
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until 
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding 
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels 
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall pro-
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a 
presiding judge from among the members of the court 
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is 
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in that office no more than two successive 
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or 
incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the 
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges 
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge 
shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of 
panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the 
Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the 
same as for the Supreme Court. isat 
78-2a«3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary. 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over. 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer, 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or other lo-
cal agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under 
Section 63-46a-12.1; 
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(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court; 
(el interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs sought by persons who are in-
carcerated or serving any other criminal sen-
tence, except petitions constituting a challenge to 
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs challenging the decisions of the 
Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first 
degTee or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domes-
tic relations cases, including, but not limited to, 
divorce, annulment, property division, child cus-
tody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(JO cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only 
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify 
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review 
and determination any matter over which the Court 
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the re-
quirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. isas 
76-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the 
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certi-
orari to the Supreme Court. isat 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in 
Salt Lake City. The Court of Appeals may perform 
any of its functions in any location within the state. 
its* 
CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-1 to 
78-3-3. 
783-4. 
78-3-5. 
78-3-6. 
78-3-7 to 
78-3-11.6. 
78-3-12. 
78-3-12.5. 
78-3-13. 
78-3-13.4. 
78-3-13.5, 
78-314.5. 
7A-IMS to 
78-3-2. Repealed. 
Term of judges — Vacancy. 
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir-
cuit court— Appeals — Jurisdiction 
when court does not exist 
Repealed. 
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
78-3-11. Repealed. 
State District Court Administrative 
System. 
Repealed. 
Costs of system. 
Repealed. 
Counties joining court system — Pro-
cedure — Facilities — Salaries. 
78-3-14. Repealed., v 
Allocation of district court fees and 
fines. 
78-3-17. Repealed. 
Section 
78-3-17.5. Application of savings accruing to 
counties. 
78-3-18. Judicial Administration Act — Short 
title. 
78-3-19. Purpose of act. 
78-3-20. Definitions. 
78-3-21. Judicial Council — Creation — Mem-
bers — Terms and election — Re-
sponsibilities — Reports. 
78-3-22. Presiding officer — Compensation — 
Duties. 
78-3-23. Administrator of the courts — Ap-
pointment — Qualifications — Sal-
ary. 
78-3*24. Court administrator — Powers, du-
ties, and responsibilities. 
78-3-25. Assistants for administrator of the 
courts — Appointment of trial court 
executives. 
78-3-26. Courts to provide information and sta-
tistical data to administrator of the 
courts. 
78-3-27. Annual judicial conference. 
78-3-28. Repealed. 
78-3-29. Presiding judge — Election — Term 
— Compensation — Powers — Du-
ties. 
76-3-30. Duties of the clerk of the district 
court. 
78-3-31. Court commissioners — Qualifications 
— Appointment — Functions gov-
erned by rule. 
784-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 1971. 1SS1, IMS 
78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy. 
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed ini-
tially until the first general election held more than 
three years after the effective date of the appoint-
ment. Thereafter, the term of office for judges of the 
district courts is six years, and commences on the 
first Monday in January, next following the date of 
election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is 
appointed and qualified. isss 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir-
cuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction 
when court does not exist 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all 
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah 
Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraor-
dinary writs and other writs necessary to carry into 
effect their orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) Under the general supervision of the presiding 
officer of the Judicial Council and subject to policies 
established by the Judicial Council, cases filed in the 
district court, which are also within the concurrent 
jurisdiction of the circuit court, may be transferred to 
the circuit court by the presiding judge of the district 
court in multiple judge districts or the district court 
judge in single judge districts. The transfer of these 
cases may be made upon the courts own motion or 
upon the motion of either party for adjudication. 
When an order is made transferring a case, the court 
shall transmit the pleadings and papers to the circuit 
court to which the case is transferred. The circuit 
court has the same jurisdiction as if the case had been 
originally commenced in the circuit court and any 
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same sex. For sexual harassment to be discriminatory, 
the following three elements must be shown to exist 
(1) Unwanted conduct or communication of a sexual 
nature which adverse)y affects a person'* employment 
relationship or working environment, if: 
(a) submission to the conduct is either an explicit or 
implicit term or condition of employment, or 
(b) submission to or rejection of the conduct is used as 
a basis for an employment decision affecting the per-
son, or 
(c) the conduct haa a purpose or effect of substantially 
interfering with a person's work performance or creat-
ing an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environ-
ment, 
(2) Unsolicited, deliberately sexual statements, ges-
tures or physical contacts which are objectionable to the 
recipient, 
(3) Undermines the integrity of the workplace, 
destroys morale and offends legal and social standards 
of acceptable behavior. 
b. Inappropriate behavior which has sexual connota-
tion but does not meet the test of sexual discrimination 
is insufficient to establish good cause for leaving work. 
11. Discrimination 
It is also a violation of Federal law to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin; or to limit, segregate, or classify 
employees in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive an individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee 
because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin. 
R562-5a-& Effective Date of Disqualification. 
1. The disqualification under this section technically 
begins with the week the claimant voluntarily quit the 
job. However, to avoid the confusion which arises when 
a disqualification is made for a period of time prior to 
the filing of a claim, the claimant will be notified that 
benefits are denied beginning with the effective date of 
a new or reopened claim. The disqualification continues 
until the claimant returns to work in a bona fide cov-
ered employment and earns six times his weekly bene-
fit amount alter the week in which the claimant left 
work. A disqualification which begins in one benefit 
year will continue into a new benefit year unless purged 
by subsequent earnings, 
2. If an individual is receiving remuneration which is 
attributed to a period of time following the last day of 
work, such as severance or vacation pay, the "week in 
which the claimant left work" is considered to be the 
last week for which such remuneration was attribut-
able as an individual is not •unemployed"' while receiv-
ing remuneration from an employer, and such 
severance or vacation pay cannot be used to purge a dis-
qualification. 
KEY: unemployment eompcnmtSoo, employment, «Bploy*#*i 
ritfhU, employ** Urminmtiom* 
ISSt SM-SXa) 
R562-5b. Discharge and Discharge for 
Crime. 
R562-5b-101. Discharge General Definition. 
R562-5b-102. Just Cause. 
R562-5b-103. Burden of Proof. 
R562-6b-104. Quit or Discharge. 
R562-5b-105. Disciplinary Suspension or Involuntary 
Furlough. 
R562-5b~i06. Proximal Cause - Relation of Offenses to 
Discharge. 
R562-5b-107. In Connection with Employment 
R562-6V108. Examples of Reasons for Discharge. 
R562-5b-10$. Effective Date of Disqualification. 
R562-5b-201. Discharge for Crime-General Definition. 
R562-5b-202. In Connection with Work. 
R562-5b-203. Dishonesty or Other Disqualifying 
Crimea. 
R562-5b-204. Admission or Conviction in a Court 
R562-5b-205. Benefit* Held in Abeyance, 
R562-5b-206. Disqualification Period. 
R562-5b-10I. Discharge General Definition. 
Ordinarily accepted concepts of justice are used in 
determining if a discharge is disqualifying under the 
"juBt cause" provisions of the Act Just cause is defined 
as a job separation that is necessary due to the serious-
ness of actual or potential harm to the employer pro-
vided the claimant had knowledge of the employers 
expectations and had control over the circumstances 
which led to the discharge. Just cause is not established 
if the reason for the discharge is baseless, arbitrary or 
capricious or the employer has failed to uniformly apply 
reasonable standards to all employees when instituting 
disciplinary action. The purpose of this section is to 
deny benefits to individuals who bring about their own 
unemployment by conducting themselves, with respect 
to their employment with callousness, misbehavior, or 
lack of consideration to such a degree that the employer 
was justified in discharging the employee. However, 
when an employee is discharged by his employer, such 
discharge may have been the result of incompetence, 
lack of skill, or other reasons which are beyond the 
claimants control. The question which must be estab-
lished by the evidence is whether the claimant is at 
fault in his resulting unemployment Unemployment 
insurance benefits will be denied if the employer had 
just cause for discharging the employee. However, not 
every cause for discharge provides a basis to deny ben-
efits. In order to have just cause for discharge pursuant 
to Section 36-4- SXbXl) there must be some fault on the 
part of the employee involved. 
R562-6b-102. Just Cause. 
1. The basic factors which establish just cause, and 
are essential for a determination of ineligibility art: 
a. Culpability 
This is the seriousness of the conduct or the severity 
of the offense as H affects continuance of the employ-
ment relationship. The discharge must have been nec-
essary to avoid actual or potential harm to the 
employers rightful interests. A discharge would not be 
considered "necessary" if it is not consistent with rea-
sonable employment practices. The wrongness of the 
conduct must be considered in the context of the partic-
ular employment and how it affects the employer's 
rights. If the conduct was an isolated incident of poor 
judgment and there is no expectation that the conduct 
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will be continued or repeated, potential harm may not 
be shown and therefore it ia not neceaaary to discharge 
the employee. 
(1) Longevity and prior work record are important in 
determining if the act or omisaion ia an isolated inci-
dent or a good faith error in judgment An employee 
who has historically complied with work rules does not 
demonstrate by a single violation, even though harm-
ful, that such violations will be repeated and therefore 
require discharge to avoid future harm to the employer. 
For example: A long term employee who does not have 
a history of tardiness or absenteeism is absent without 
leave for a number of days due to a death in his imme-
diate family Although this is a violation of the employ-
era rules and may establish just cause for discharging 
a new employee, the fact that the employee has estab-
lished over a long period of time that he complies with 
attendance rules shows that the circumstance is mora 
of an isolated incident rather than a violation of the 
rules that is or could be expected to be habitual. In this 
case because the potential for harm to the employer ia 
not shown, it is not necessary for the employer to dis-
charge the employee, and therefore just cause is not 
established 
b Knowledge 
The employee must have had a knowledge of the con-
duct which the employer expected. It ia not necessary 
that the claimant intended to cause harm to the 
employer, but he should reasonably have been able to 
anticipate the effect his conduct would have Knowl-
edge may not be established unless the employer gave 
a dear explanation of the expected behavior or had a 
pertinent written policy, except in the case of a flagrant 
violation of a universal standard of behavior If the 
employer's expectations are unclear, ambiguous or 
inconsistent, the existence of knowledge is not shown 
A specific warning is one way of showing that the 
employee had knowledge of the expected conduct After 
the employee is given a warning he should be given an 
opportunity to correct objectionable conduct Additional 
violations occurring after the warning would be neces-
sary to establish just cause for a discharge. 
(1) For Example When the employer has an estab-
lished procedure of progressive discipline, auch proce-
dures generally must have been followed in order to 
establish that the employee had knowledge of the 
expected behavior or the seriousness of the act The 
exception ia that very severe conduct, auch as criminal 
actions, may justify immediate discharge without fol-
lowing a progressive disciplinary program 
c Control 
The conduct must have been within the power and 
capacity of the claimant to control or prevent 
2 Just cause may not be established when the reason 
for discharge is based on such things as mere mistakes, 
inefficiency, failure of performance as the result of 
inability or incapacity, inadvertence in isolated 
instances, good faith errors in judgment or in the exer-
cise of discretion, minor but casual or unintentional 
carelessness or negligence, etc These examples of con-
duct are not disqualifying because of the lack of knowl-
edge or control. However, continued inefficiency, 
repeated carelessness, or lack of care exercised by ordi-
nary, reasonable workers in similar circumstances, 
may be disqualifying depending on the reason and 
degree of the carelessness, the knowledge and control of 
the employe*. 
3. The term *5ust cause" as used in Section 5(bXl) 
does not lesaen the requirement that there be some 
fault on the part of the employee involved. Prior to the 
1983 addition of the term "just cause" the Commiaaion 
interpreted Section 6(bXl) to require an intentional 
infliction of harm or intentional disregard of the 
employer's interests. The intent of the Legislature in 
adding the worda "5uat cause* to Section 5<bXl) was 
apparently to correct this restrictive interpretation. 
While some fault must be present, it ia sufficient that 
the acta were intended, the consequences were reason-
ably foreseeable, and that such acta have serious effect 
on the employee's job or the employer's interests. 
R£62-5b-10a. Burden of Proof. 
1. In a discharge, the employer initiates the separa-
tion and, as such, ia the primary source of information 
with regard to the reasons for the dismissal. The 
employer has the burden of proof which is the responsi-
bility to establish the facta resulting in the discharge. 
The employer is required by the Statute in Section 35-
4-11(g) to keep accurate records and to provide correct 
information to the Department for proper administra-
tion of the Act Although the employer has the burden 
to establish just cause for the discharge, if sufficient 
facts are obtained from the claimant, a decision will be 
made based on the information available. The failure of 
one party to provide information does not necessarily 
result in a ruling favorable to the other party. 
2 All interested parties have the right to give rebuttal 
to information contrary to the interests of that party. 
R562-6b-104. Quit or Discharge. 
The determination of whether a separation is a quit 
or a discharge is made by the Department baaed on the 
circumstances which resulted in the separation. The 
conclusions on the employer's records, the separation 
notice or the claimant's report are not controlling on the 
Department 
1 Discharge Before Effective Date of Resignation 
a Discharge 
When an individual notifies an employer that he 
intends to leave aa of a definite date in the future and 
ia discharged prior to that date, the cause for the sepa-
ration on the day the separation takes place ia the con-
trolling factor in determining whether it waa a quit or 
discharge Although the separation might have been 
motivated by the claimants announced resignation, the 
employer was the moving party in ending the employ-
ment prior to the resignation date. Therefore, the 
immediate reason was more closely related to the 
employer'a action than to the daimanfa announced 
intention to quit Unless disqualifying conduct ia 
involved, the separation ia conaidered to be for the con-
venience of the employer. If the employer does not pay 
regular wagea through the period of the notice but 
merely pays vacation pay which was not previously 
assigned to the period of the notice, the separation la 
still the result of a discharge which occurs prior to the 
date the worker planned to quit The assignment of 
vacation pay to the period of time between the notice of 
intended resignation and the last date the employee 
planned work does not change the character of the aep-
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aration. 
b Quit 
If an employee announce* a future date of resignation 
and is relieved of work responsibilities but ia paid reg-
ular wages through the date of his announced resigna-
tion, it is not a discharge, but a quit 
2 Leaving in Anticipation of Discharge 
When an employee leaves work in anticipation of a 
possible discharge or layoff, and if the reason for the 
discharge would not be disqualifying, the separation ia 
generally considered to be a voluntary quit However, 
an individual who leaves work to avoid virtually certain 
discharge for disqualifying conduct cannot thereby 
avoid the disqualifying provisions of Section 36-4 -5(b), 
and the separation ia considered a discharge rather 
than voluntary leaving. 
3. Employee Knows His Action will Result in Dis-
charge 
Absence taken without permission, or other actions 
contrary to specific reasonable instructions from the 
employer, are generally considered a voluntary separa-
tion rather than discharge, if the worker was given a 
choice of complying or being separated. 
R562-5b-105. Disc ipl inary S u s p e n s i o n or 
Involuntary Furlough. 
When an employee is put on a disciplinary suspension 
or involuntary furlough, he may meet the definition of 
"unemployed." If the claimant files during the suspen-
sion or furlough, the reason for the suspension or fur-
lough must be adjudicated as a discharge, even though 
the claimant is still attached to the employer and 
expects to return to work. A suspension which waa rea-
sonable and necessary to prevent potential harm to the 
employer or to maintain necessary discipline would 
generally result in a disqualification under this section 
provided the elements of control and knowledge are 
present Failure to return to work at the end of the def-
inite period of suspension or furlough would be consid-
ered a voluntary quit and eligibility would then be 
determined consistent with Section 35-4-6U), if the 
claimant had not been previously denied. 
R662-5b-106. Proximal Cause - Re la t ion of 
Offenses to Discharge. 
1. The cause for discharge is that conduct which moti-
vates the employer to make the decision to terminate 
the employee's services. If the decision has truly been 
made, it is generally demonstrated by way of notice to 
the employee or the initiation of a personnel action. 
Although the employer may learn of other ofTensea fol-
lowing the making of the decision to terminate, the rea-
son for the discharge is limited to that conduct of which 
the employer was aware prior to making the decision. 
However, if the employer dischargee a person because 
of some preliminary evidence of certain conduct, but 
does not obtain all of the proof of the conduct until after 
the separation notice is given, it could still be concluded 
that the discharge was caused by that conduct which 
the employer was investigating. Eligibility for benefits 
will then be determined by considering the extent of 
culpability, knowledge and control 
2. When the discharge does not occur immediately 
after the employer becomes aware of an offense, a pre-
sumption arises that there were other reasons for the 
discharge. This relationship between the offense and 
the discharge must be established both as to cause and 
time. The presumption that the conduct was not the 
cause of the discharge may be overcome by a showing 
that the delay was due to such things as investigation 
arbitration, or hearings conducted with regard to the 
employee's conduct When a grievance or arbitration ia 
pending with respect to the discharge, the Depart-
ment's decision will be baaed on the information avail-
able to the Department The Department's decision ia 
not binding on the grievance resolution process or an 
arbitrator and the decision of the arbitrator ia not bind-
ing On the Department When an employer ia faced 
with the necessity of a reduction in his workforce but 
uses an employee's prior conduct as the criteria for 
determining who will be laid ofT, the lack of work is the 
primary motivation or cause of the discharge, not the 
conduct 
R562-5b-107. In Connection with Employment 
Disqualifying conduct is not limited to offenses which 
take place on the employers premises or during busi-
ness hours. It is only necessary that the conduct have 
Buch "connection" to the employee's duties and to the 
employer's business that it is a subject of legitimate and 
significant concern to the employer. All employers, both 
public and private have the right to expect employees to 
refrain from acts which are detrimental to the business 
or would bring dishonor on the business name or the 
institution. Legitimate interests of employers include, 
but are not limited to: goodwill of customers, reputation 
of the business, efficiency, business costs, morale of 
employees, discipline, honesty, trust and loyalty. 
R562«6b-10& Examples of Reasons for Discharge. 
In all the following examples, the basic elements of 
just cause must be considered in determining eligibility 
for benefits. The following examples do not include all 
reasons for discharge. 
I. Violation of Company Rules 
If an employee violates reasonable rules of the 
employer and the three elements of culpability, knowl-
edge and control are established, benefits must be 
denied. 
a. "Hie reasonableness of the employer's rules will 
depend on the necessity for such a rule as it aflects the 
employer's interests. Rules which are contrary to gen-
era] public policy or which infringe upon the recognized 
rights and privileges of individuals may not be reason-
able. An employer must have broader prerogatives in 
regulating conduct when employees are on the job than 
when they are not An employer must be able to make 
rules for employee on-the-job conduct that reasonably 
further the legitimate business interests of the 
employer. An employer is not required to impose only 
minimum standards, but there may be some justifiable 
cause for violations of rules that are unreasonable or 
unduly harsh, rigorous or exacting. When rules are 
changed, adequate notice and reasonable opportunity 
to comply must be afforded. If the employee believes a 
rule is unreasonable, he has the responsibility to dis-
cuss his concerns with the employer and give the 
employer an opportunity to take corrective action. 
b. Discharges may be regulated by an employment 
contract or collective bargaining agreement Just cause 
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for the discharge is not established if the employee's 
conduct was consistent with his rights under such con-
tract or the discharge was contrary to the provisions of 
such contract. 
c. Habitual offenses may not be disqualifying conduct 
if it ifi found that the act was condoned by the employer 
or was so prevalent as to be customary. However, when 
the worker is given notice that the conduct will no 
longer be tolerated, further violations could result in a 
denial of benefits. 
d. Culpability may be established even if the result of 
the violation of the rule does not in and of itself cause 
harm to the employer, but the resultant lack of compli-
ance with rules diminishes the employer's ability to 
have order and control. Culpability is established if ter-
mination of the employee was required to maintain nec-
essary discipline in the company. 
e. Knowledge of the employer's standards of behavior 
is usually provided in the form of verbal instructions, 
written rules and/or warnings. However, the warning is 
not always necessary for a disqualification to apply in 
cases of violations of a serious nature of universal stan-
dards of conduct of which the claimant should have 
been aware without being warned. 
2. Attendance Violations 
a. It is the duty of the worker to be punctual and 
remain at work within the reasonable requirements of 
the employer. Discharge for unjustified absence or tar-
diness is considered disqualifying if the worker knows 
that he is violating attendance rules. Such violations 
are generally a serious matter of concern to employers 
as attendance standards are necessary to maintain 
order, control, and productivity. Discharge for an atten-
dance violation beyond the control of the worker ia not 
disqualifying unless the worker reasonably could have 
given notice or obtained permission consistent with the 
employer's rules. 
b. In cases of termination for violations of attendance 
atandards, the employee's recent hiatory of attendance 
shall be considered to determine if the violation is an 
isolated incident, or demonstrates a pattern of unjusti-
fied absences within the control of the employee. Fla-
grant misuse of attendance privileges may result in a 
denial of benefits even if the last incident was beyond 
the employee's control. 
3. Falsification of Work Record 
a. The duty of honesty is inherent in any employee/ 
employer relationship. A statement made in an applica-
tion for a job may be considered as connected with the 
work, even though it is made before the work begins. An 
individual begins his obligations as an employee when 
he makes an application for work. One of those obliga-
tions is to give the employer truthful answers to all 
material questions. Any falsification of information 
which may operate to expose the employer to possible 
loss, litigation, or damage would be considered material 
and therefore may establish culpability. If the claimant 
made a false statement while applying for work in order 
to be hired, benefits may be denied even if the claimant 
would have otherwise remained unemployed and eligi-
ble for the receipt of unemployment benefits depending 
upon the degree of knowledge, culpability and control 
4. Insubordination 
Authority is required in the work place to maintain 
order and efficiency. An employer has the right to 
expect that lines of authority will be maintained; that 
reasonable orders, given in a civil manner, will be 
obeyed; that supervisors will be respected and that 
their authority will not be undermined. In determining 
when insubordination (resistance to authority) 
becomes disqualifying conduct, ths fact that there was 
a disregard of the employer's interests is the major 
importance. Mere protests or dissatisfaction without an 
overt act is not in disregard of the employer's interests. 
However, provocative remarks to a superior or vulgar 
or profane language in response to a civil request may 
be insubordination if it is conducive to disruption of 
routine, negation of authority and impairment of effi-
ciency. Mere incompatibility or emphatic insistence or 
discussion by an employee who was acting in good faith 
is not disqualifying conduct. 
6. Loss of License 
When an employee loses a license which he knows is 
required for the performance of the job, and the individ-
ual had control over the circumstances which resulted 
in the loss of the license, such conduct is disqualifying. 
For example, if the claimant worked as a driver, and 
lost his license because of a conviction for driving under 
the influence (DUD, culpability is established if he fails 
to obtain a permit to drive at work or the conviction 
would expose the employer to additional liabilities. The 
employer cannot authorize an employee to drive in vio-
lation of the law. Also, additional insurance costs or 
other liabilities are a legitimate concern of the 
employer. Knowledge is established because it is a mat-
ter of common knowledge in the State of Utah that driv-
ing under the influence of alcohol is a violation of the 
law and is punishable by loss of the individual's driving 
privileges. Judicial notice can be taken of this fact 
because a question relative to this matter is on every 
driver's license test. He had control in that he made a 
conscious decision to risk loss of the license when he 
failed to make arrangements for transportation prior to 
becoming under the influence of intoxicants, 
R562-£b-109. Effective Date of Disqualification. 
The Act provides that any disqualification under this 
section will include "the week in which the claimant 
was discharged . . ." However, to avoid confusion, the 
denial of benefits will begin with the Sunday of the 
week for which claimant has filed for benefits. 
R562-5b-201. Discharge for Crime-General 
Definition. 
1. A crime is a punishable act in violation of law; an 
offense against the State or the United States. "Crime" 
and "Misdemeanor* are synonymous terms; though in 
common usage crime is used to denote offenses of a 
more serious nature. However, for example: an insignif-
icant, although illegal act, or the taking or destruction 
of something which is of little or no value, or believed to 
have been abandoned may not be sufficient to establish 
that a crime was committed as defined for the applica-
tion of this section of the Act, even if the claimant was 
found guilty of a violation of the law. 
2. The duties of honesty and responsible behavior are 
implied in any employment relationship. A worker is 
obligated to deal with his employer responsibly in 
truthfulness and good faith. The penalties imposed by 
this Section (a 52 week disqualification and subsequent 
APPENDIX A (Page 10) 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 14 
TITLE III. 
REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, COMMIS-
SIONS, AND COMMITTEES. 
Rule 14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained; 
intervention. 
(a) Petition for review of order; joint petition. When judicial review by 
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals is provided by statute of an order 
or decision of an administrative agency, board, commission, committee, or 
officer (hereinafter the term "agency" shall include agency, board, commis-
sion, committee, or officer), a petition for review shall be filed with the clerk of 
the appellate court within the time prescribed by statute, or if there is no time 
prescribed, then within 30 days after the date of the written decision or order. 
The term petition for review* includes a petition to eryoin, set aside, suspend, 
modify, or otherwise review a notice of appeal or a writ of certiorari. The 
petition shall specify the parties seeking review and shall designate the re-
spondents) and the order or decision, or part thereof, to be reviewed. In each 
case, the agency shall be named respondent. The State of Utah shall be 
deemed a respondent if so required by statute, even though not so designated 
in the petition. If two or more persons are entitled to petition for review of the 
&ame order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they 
may file a joint petition for review and may thereafter proceed as a single 
petitioner. 
(b) Statutory and docketing fees. At the time of filing any petition for 
review, the party obtaining the review shall pay to the clerk of the appellate 
court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing 
the appeal. The clerk shall not accept a petition for review unless the filing 
and docketing fees are paid. 
(c) Service of petition. A copy of the petition for review shall be served by 
the petitioner on the named respondent(s), upon all other parties to the pro-
ceeding before the agency, and upon the Attorney General of Utah, if the state 
is a party, in the manner prescribed by Rule 3(e). The petitioner, at the time of 
filing the petition for review, shall also file with the clerk of the appellate 
court a certificate reflecting service upon all parties to the agency proceeding 
who have been served. 
(d) Intervention. Any person who seeks to intervene in a proceeding under 
this rule shall serve upon all parties to the proceeding and upon all parties 
who participated before the agency, and file with the clerk of the appellate 
court a motion for leave to intervene. The motion shall contain a concise 
statement of the interest of the moving party and the grounds upon which 
intervention is sought. A motion for leave to intervene shall be filed within 40 
days of the date on which the petition for review is filed. 
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